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D'Arcy Vermette*

Colonialism and the Process of
Defining Aboriginal People

It is not uncommon for Aboriginal law students to experience discomfort in studying
the law The discomfort is not unique to legal studies, but the law provides a
venue where the effects of the imposition of colonial norms are starkly revealed. In
law school the author had to confront how Canadian law has attempted to control
Aboriginal identity, at first through legislation and then through the courts. While
the locus and style of controlling Aboriginal identity has changed over time, the
practice of controlling Aboriginal identity is ever present. This process of control
dehumanizes individuals and peoples and continues into the present. This paper
examines the ways in which colonial law and legal process attempt to define
Aboriginal identity
II n'est pas rare que des 6tudiants autochtones 6prouvent un malaise face i
I'6tude du droit. Un tel malaise n'est pas exclusif.J I'6tude du droit, mais c'est un
domaine ot) les cons6quences de I'imposition de normes coloniales sont mises
, nu. A la facult6 de droit, I'auteura dO s'attaquer 1 la question de d6terminer
comment le droit canadien a tent6 de contr6ler I'identit6 autochtone, d'abord par
des lois, puis par l'interm6diaire des tribunaux. Mdme si le style de contr6le de
I'identit6 autochtone et le lieu ot) il s'exerce ont chang6 au fil du temps, la pratique
reste omnipresente. Ce processus de contr6le d~shumanise les individus et les
peuples, et ilest toujours pratiqud. L'article examine les m6thodes appliqu6es
par le droit colonial et le processus juridique pour tenter de dufinir I'identit6
autochtone.
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Prologue
When I graduated from law school it was a strangely unfulfilling moment.
I wasn't sure if I had really accomplished anything, what I had learned, or
what I was missing.' During the vast majority of my time at law school I
felt that I lacked the opportunity to express myself. I felt dislocated from
class discussion and curriculum, and the idea of speaking in class made me
uncomfortable. I couldn't imagine where I would begin talking. Looking
back on it now, it is easy to see that part of the problem was that I was
unable to deal with the law on its own terms. This is because the law, as
I saw it, was an exclusionary and oppressive force. Specifically, I was
having trouble finding Aboriginal people in the law. I saw them in the
case law when they were charged with a crime, or when they were trying
to defend their way of life and autonomy in Aboriginal rights cases, but

1. Patricia Monture-Angus, Thunder in my Soul: A Mohawk Woman Speaks (Halifax: Fernwood
Publishing, 1995) at 97 [Thunder] where she writes: "In first year, I internalized this characteristic
of colonialism and oppression, believing if I could only change, perhaps fit in a little better, my law
school experience would be rewarding....
In speaking with other Aboriginal law students, it iSeasy to recognize this 'something missing'
feeling in their personal stories. The feeling that 'something' is missing is knowing that you are an
outsider."
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Aboriginal scholarship was not a factor even in the most recent case law
or in much of the reading material. Aboriginal people certainly weren't
deciding the cases, and we weren't seeing Aboriginal peoples' laws
reflected in "Aboriginal law." How was I supposed to speak up in class,
or in my writing assignments, about something that wasn't even part of
the analysis? It was frustrating and my time in law school was largely
consumed with trying to figure out how to make Aboriginal people's
concerns the centre of my legal education.
In an effort to bring some meaning to my law degree I decided to
build upon it by completing a Master's degree. I felt burdened by the
way the law talked about, or failed to talk about, Aboriginal people. I
wanted to resist the tendency of legal discourse to be limited to only
that which is "doctrinal." That is to say, "the law" is often discussed in
such a way that we can forget that it is a human undertaking involving
human actions and decisions. Doctrinal analysis involves deconstructing
problems. Legal scholars, students and judges are expected to break down
cases and disputes until all we see are the legal principles, encapsulated
by fancy words like sui generis. With this approach we lose sight of the
larger picture. In an effort to refocus on that larger picture, my Master's
thesis examined the colonization and oppression of Aboriginal people. I
wanted to show the many varying ways in which the law encompasses
these themes. When I was done writing my Master's thesis I realized that
the problem I had in law school was that I found the act of undertaking a
doctrinal analysis to be, in itself, colonizing.
My thesis-and this paper which grew out of one its chapters-is
an expression of my Aboriginal voice. Writing about the themes that I
couldn't find a way to address while in law school provides an accurate,
simple and direct way of identifying my approach to legal analysis.
When I say I am writing with my Aboriginal voice, I do not mean that I
am expressing myself in a traditional manner or speaking of traditional
laws and customs. I mean that I am sharing my view of colonial law with
full consciousness of my Aboriginal self. My Aboriginal self has been
colonized in ways which continue to make me deeply uncomfortable.
Perhaps that is why I am not prepared to peel back any layers of myself
in order to fit my expression into legal doctrine.' Mari Matsuda explains
that

2.
Mari J. Matsuda, Where is Your Body? And Other Essays on Race, Gender and the Law (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1996) at 5 writes: "This student, as she has become older, has learned to peel away
layers of consciousness like layers of an onion."
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The students who excel in law schools - and the best lawyers - are the
ones who are able to detach law and to see it as a system that makes
sense only from a particular viewpoint. Those lawyers can operate
within that view and then shift out of it for purposes of critique, analysis,
and strategy.'
I am unable to detach law easily or consistently. Perhaps I did not excel in
law school because the law's construction of Aboriginal people constantly
weighed upon my mind and I could not find relief by calling upon a
different viewpoint. Also, I felt a responsibility not to make such a shift.
Gordon Christie explains why it is a responsibility for Aboriginal people
to remain conscious of our Aboriginal identity:
One responsibility incumbent on all Aboriginal people is that set by the
need to resist attempts by others to undercut Aboriginal peoples' senses
of identity, ... In a sense, then, Aboriginal people can only continue to
be Aboriginal people to the extent they can maintain within them a deep
sense of responsibility to their ancestors and their descendants.4 .
I use my writing as a form of resistance. By maintaining my Aboriginal
identity and focus in my writing, I am able to discuss the law in a way that
I find meaningful. Still, the fragmentation that legal scholarship demands
remains a barrier to my writing.'
In this paper I will talk about the law, the colonizer, and oppression.
On the one hand, the use of the term "the colonizer" is, of course, entirely
non-descriptive. Because of its breadth, "the colonizer" does not work
well in capturing specific colonizing actions, policies, or participants.
But such a broad term can be useful when describing the culmination of
those actions, policies and participants. That is to say that if you are an
Aboriginal person having your lifestyle attacked in the Canadian courts,
or an Aboriginal student reading the judgment which that same Canadian
court has imposed upon Aboriginal peoples, it is not hard to identify the
court as being "the colonizer." But why not simply refer to the court
as "the Court"? Because that Court, and the government, legislation,
and belief systems which support it are actively involved in colonizing
Aboriginal people and it is important to keep that reality to the fore. Such

3.
Ibid. at 7, 8.
4.
Gordon Christie, "Law, Theory and Aboriginal Peoples" (2003) 2 Indigenous L.J. 67 at 113.
5.
See Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples
(London: Zed Books, 1999) at 28 writes that "Fragmentation is not a phenomenon of postmodernism as
many might claim. For indigenous peoples fragmentation has been the consequence of imperialism."
She continues at 29: "many indigenous scholars who work in the social and other sciences struggle to
write, theorize and research as indigenous scholars."

Colonialism and the Process of Defining
Aboriginal People

215

language also helps illustrate that Canadian courts are situated differently
for Aboriginal people. Patricia Monture-Angus explains:
In my opinion, Canadian law can only bind Canadians. Canadian
courts are more appropriately suited to defining Canadian duties than
Aboriginal rights. Courts have demonstrated a tremendous difficulty
in understanding two significant components of these rights, namely
Aboriginal history(s) and Aboriginal culture(s). Aboriginal Peoples are
bound only by their traditional laws until such a time that they freely
consent to the application of Canadian laws.6
It is equally important to keep in mind that colonial action spans various
venues. In that regard, "the colonizer" is an appropriate way to characterize
the imposition of foreign values, power, and judgements upon Aboriginal
people and nations regardless of the specific venue that captures the
expression of this imposition.
Introduction
Twenty-five years after the introduction of constitutional protection for
Aboriginal rights, the law continues to construct a landscape where people,
as objects, as words, are created and recreated, defined and redefined. They
become "word clay" to be molded and recast as the situation presents. The
law attacks Aboriginal people's identity in the most direct way when these
definitions are applied to Aboriginal people's very existence as people(s).
Colonial legal traditions have built upon colonial myths of superiority by
casting definitions upon Aboriginal people. We all have the capacity to
define the world around us in various ways. The most direct and personal
way to define our world might be to declare who we are. But in Canadian
courts, the power to define the world is something that rests squarely in the
hands of the colonizer. For the colonizer, the process of defining the world
for others has, historically, served to legitimize colonial endeavours.
In this paper I will explore the practice of defining Aboriginal people
in colonial law. I believe that the current undertakings of the Supreme
Court of Canada represent a continuation of the same process of labelling
and defining that embodied earlier attacks on Aboriginal people and
their identity. To show this pattern.I will provide the reader with a brief
overview of some of the dehumanizing ways Aboriginal people have been
labelled in the past. I will begin by looking at popular views which helped
support the civilization policies found in pre-Confederation legislation. I
will then review the ways in which Aboriginal people were defined in early

6.
Patricia Monture-Angus, JourneyingForward:dreamingFirstNations'independence(Halifax,
NS: Femwood Publishing, 1999) at 80 [Monture-Angus, Independence].
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legislation, followed by a look at the early court cases involving definitions
of Aboriginal people. While some of the discussions at the beginning
of this paper are about earlier times, they give context to the actions of
Canadian courts. Finally, I will look at the.more recent decisions of the
Supreme Court of Canada involving definitions of Aboriginal people. In
each of these examples, the wrappings may change but a common theme
is shared throughout: the dehumanization of Aboriginal peoples.
The dehumanization of Aboriginal peoples is both a result- of and
justification for colonizing actions. The imposition of colonial institutions,
laws, and values stifles dialogue and prescribes answers to Aboriginal
peoples. Such colonial action "attempts to control thinking and action,
leads women and men to adjust to the world, and inhibits their creative
power."7 In order to avoid dehumanizing an oppressed population, it is
essential to allow them to define their own world:
It is not our role to speak to the people about our own view of the world,
nor to attempt to impose that view on them, but rather to dialogue with
the people about their view and ours. We must realize that their view of
the world, manifested variously in their action, reflects their situationin
the world. Educational and political action which is not critically aware
of this situation runs the risk either of "banking" or of preaching in the
desert.'
This paper will provide examples of how the law does not allow the room
necessary to have true dialogue with Aboriginal peoples; instead, in both
the past and the present, colonial law has set out to define Aboriginal
peoples.
I. A population to dehumanize
The elimination of Aboriginal peoples was long a primary objective of
colonial policy. Whether this objective was carried out through relocation,
assimilation, or armed conflict, Aboriginal residents of the land were to
be removed. Serving this ultimate purpose were the pejorative views
which colonizers held about Aboriginal people. These characterizations
contributed to the perception that Aboriginal people were worthless and
thus supported the mission of conquest that is colonialism. It is easy to
justify the extermination of a worthless thing, and so Aboriginal people

7.
Paolo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Continuum, 1995) at 58. Here Freire is
discussing the "Banking" concept of education. Banking involves depositing answers to students
and withdrawing those answers at exam time. This process lacks true dialogue. It serves as an apt
description of relations between Aboriginal peoples and colonial law.
8.
Ibid.at 77.
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were painted as worthless. In speaking of the experience of the United
States of America, Troy Duster writes:
The fifth condition [for a guilt free massacre] is the existence of what
we can literally call a target population. There has to be a population
to massacre, a vulnerable population, a population that has inferior
firepower (or better, no firepower at all).. .Does anyone need to be
reminded that this nation massacred so many native American Indians
that only a fraction remain?9
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the costs of expansionism
were borne by Aboriginal peoples. The colonial project expanded while
Aboriginal nations were undermined. The popular thought of the time
facilitated the decimation and oppression of Aboriginal peoples:
Oliver Wendell Holmes claimed that Indians were nothing more than
a 'half-filled outline of humanity' whose 'extermination' was the
necessary 'solution to the problem of [their] relation to the white race.'
Similarly, William Dean Howells took 'patriotic pride' in advocating
'the extermination of the red savages of the plains.' And Theodore
Roosevelt maintained that the extermination of the American Indians
and the expropriation of their lands 'was as ultimately beneficial as it
was inevitable.'10
There are no set figures for the number of deaths resulting from European
colonization of Aboriginal peoples in the Americas. However, some
historians have placed the total number of deaths at close to one hundred
million for all of the Americas."
Although dehumanization was central to justifying the "Indian Wars"
in the United States, Canada's experience was not so directly violent.
Within the borders of what is now Canada, full frontal armed attack on
Aboriginal communities was not the practice of choice. 12 Instead, Canada's

9.
Troy Duster, "Conditions for a Guilt-Free Massacre" in William E. Henry & Nevitt Sanford,
eds., Sanctions ForEvil (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1971) 25 at 32.
10. James P. Sterba, "Understanding Evil: American Slavery, the Holocaust, and the Conquest of the
American Indians" (1996) 106 Ethics 424 at 430.
It. Mark Cocker, Rivers of Blood, Rivers of Gold: Europe's Conquest of IndigenousPeoples (New
York: Grove Press, 1998) at 5. Cocker notes that, as compared to pre-contact population estimates,
only ten percent ofAboriginal peoples north of Mexico survived contact up to the end of the nineteenth
century.
12. See L.F.S. Upton, "The Extermination of the Beothucks of Newfoundland" in J.R. Miller, ed.,
Sweet Promises: A Reader on Indian-White Relations in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1991) at 68. Upton describes the extermination of the Beothucks as resulting from a three-stage
process centring on the competition for resources. This tragic episode in the colonization of North
America was characterized by smaller skirmishes, murders and disease. The extermination of the
Beothucks was complete in 1829.
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Indian policy was focused on "protection, civilization and assimilation."' 3
The exercise of protection was in regards to Aboriginal people's physical
bodies and came at the expense of Aboriginal culture. The intention was
to eradicate Aboriginal culture and identity through assimilation into nonAboriginal culture. Once assimilated, Aboriginal people would no longer
be in need of special status and would be able to look after their own
interests according to colonial norms. So, although different methods
were used, eradication was the goal in both Canada and the United States.
The major difference was that where the United States carried out this goal
by removing Aboriginal people physically through massacres, Canadian14
officials chose to focus on eradicating the "Aboriginal" from the people.
The intention was to save Aboriginal people from what was perceived as
their own dying culture.
In James Sterba's comparative analysis of American slavery, the
Jewish Holocaust, and the conquest of American Indians, he establishes
that the dehumanization of each of these groups was accomplished by
attribution of a particularly deplorable trait. For example, blacks were
characterized as "moral simpletons"' 5 which, he explains, allowed them
to be looked upon as children, and Jews were viewed as "irredeemably
evil"' 6 for rejecting God and killing Jesus. By comparison, American
Indians were viewed as being "backward" and "heathen."' 7 Sterba states
that such factors enabled both the British and the Americans to commit
atrocities upon Aboriginal people. The dehumanization of Aboriginal
people embodied perceptions of the superiority of the colonizers. Once
the myths of "backward" and "heathen" are established, both the death of
a people and the death of a culture seem justified. This dehumanization
was brought into early legislation which defined Aboriginal people. This
legislation often had as its goal the extermination of Aboriginal culture.
Indeed, if these "backward," "animal," "savage," and "primitive" people
were to be "civilized," then it would be necessary to be able to identify
who they were, not only as communities but also as individuals.

13. John L. Tobias, "Protection, Civilization, Assimilation: An Outline History of Canada's Indian
Policy" in Miller, ibid., 127 at 127.
14. On the differences between American and Canadian treatment of Aboriginal people, see Sidney
L. Hating, White Man s Law: Native People in Nineteenth- Century CanadianJurisprudence(Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1998) at 7 where he writes: "The result, however, was very much the
same, with Indians killed by disease, impoverished, and deprived of their lands in both countries."
15. Sterba, supra note lOat 432.
16. Ibid. at 433.
17. Ibid. at434-35.
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II. Paintingwith a single brush
Aboriginal peoples' diversity is something that is not captured by words
like "Aboriginal" or "Indian." As discussed below, however, this did not
hinder colonial governments from enacting various pieces of legislation
defining these words and, as a consequence, defining Aboriginal peoples
themselves. Still, given the cultural diversity of Aboriginal peoples in
North America, why was it necessary to have a common label for all of
them? Frideres suggests that it was the result of European confusion and a
search for simplicity. He writes that even when Europeans did acknowledge
Aboriginal peoples' differences "they were considered minor attributes
and were subsumed under the master trait of 'Indian."'I
Beyond the obviously offensive words and notions discussed earlier,
using words like "Indian" (and "Aboriginal") promotes thinking that
denies the autonomy of individual Aboriginal nations. It is a problem that
follows changes in terminology. Whether you prefer using "Indian," "First
Nations," "Indigenous," or "Aboriginal," you will encounter problems
finding a fit. Patricia Monture-Angus has expressed this problem in
her writing: "I hesitated when I saw the word Aboriginal or Native or
First Nations or Indian.. .Iwas not comfortable with them but I used
them... None of these words feel right or fit right (like shoes a size too
small)." 9 Indeed, it is a cruel irony that in this paper, I can at once resist
the imposition of colonial legal assumptions and at the same time cannot
escape colonial labels, if I want to communicate effectively." As Frideres
noted above, striving for universality in terminology led to the widespread
use of "Indian." And so, nations were lost in the shuffle of colonial words.
Indeed, as we will see below, the word "Indian" was legislatively defined
with a focus more on individuals than on nations.
III. Pre-Confederationlegislation, haphazarddefinitions
Confusion has not only surrounded colonial terminology describing
Aboriginal people, it has also pervaded legal def'mitions as well. In this
section I will review the pre-Confederation legislation defining Indians.
Two themes are apparent in this legislation: one, colonial authority
applies definitions to both "Indians" and Indian lands; and two, there is a
continuation of efforts to "civilize" and assimilate Aboriginal people with
the ultimate goal of cultural extermination. It is also apparent through
18. James S.Frideres & Ren6 R. Gadacz, AboriginalPeoples in Canada: Contemporary Conflicts,
6th ed. (Toronto: Prentice Hall, 2001) at 24.
19. Monture-Angus, Thunder, supra note I at 2.
20. For an examination of the contradictions that Aboriginal people can face in academia see, ibid.
at 53-76.
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the legislation that the full scope of "Indian" is hard to determine. For
example, at times the legislation appears to craft the term "Indian" in a
21
way which is inclusive of the Mrtis.
Colonial authority defines Aboriginalpeople
Early legislation dealing with Aboriginal people seemed to neglect the
problem of definition altogether. For example, 1821 legislation refers to
"native Indians" ' 22 but does not offer a definition of this term. Still, this did
not leave open the possibility that First Nations would be able to define
themselves. Certainly the crafters of such legislation would have had
some meaning in mind when they used the term "Indian." In the absence
of such clarification it would be up to colonial courts, not a First Nation,
to decide the scope of terminology used. Aboriginal people would soon
find that their legal identity could be changed along with the whims of
colonial politics.
More complete definitions would be helpful to colonial legal analysis
because legal outcomes often turn on the definitions of words. In that
regard, other pre-Confederation legislation explicitly defined who was an
Indian. An Act for the better protection of the Lands and Property of the
23 defines Indian in the following way:
Indians in Lower Canada
V. And for the purpose of determining any right of property,,possession
or occupation in or to any lands belonging or appropriated to any Tribe
or Body of Indians in Lower Canada, Be it declared and enacted: That
the following classes of persons are and shall be considered as Indians
belonging to the Tribe or Body of Indians interested in such lands:
First.- All persons of Indian blood, reputed to belong to the particular
Body or Tribe of Indians interested in such lands, and their descendants.
Secondly. - All persons intermarried with any such Indians and residing
amongst them, and the descendants of all such persons.
Thirdly. - All persons residing among such Indians, whose parents on
either side were or are Indians of such Body or Tribe, or entitled to be
considered as such: And
Fourthly. - All persons adopted in infancy by any such Indians, and
residing in the Village or upon the lands of such Tribe or Body of Indians,
and their descendants.24
21. For a more recent treatment of this issue, see Danielsv. Canada(MinisterofIndian andNorthern
Affairs), [2002] 4 F.C. 550 (T.D.) [Daniels].
22. An Act for regulating the Fur Trade, and establishing a Criminal and Civil Jurisdictionwithin
certainParts of North America, 1821 (U.K.), I & 2 Geo. IV,c.66.
23. S.Prov. C. 1850 (13 & 14 Vict.), c. 42.
24. Ibid.
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Blood, intermarriage, and ancestry are central to the first three categories.
It is interesting to note that the first and second categories clearly include
those of mixed blood. While the first category uses "their descendants"
without any limitations, the second category explicitly takes into account
those of mixed blood. As well, the third category of Indians would also
include those of mixed blood by stating "whose parents on either side were
or are Indians." The fourth category raises the possibility that a person's
genetic heritage is irrelevant to being "Indian" and allows for the possibility
that being "Indian" is more about lived culture, rather than genetics.
Although the preceding legislation is not well refined, other legislation
is even less clear. For example, AnAct to encouragethegradualCivilization
of the Indian Tribes in this Province, and to amend the Laws respecting
Indians25 enacted in Upper Canada in 1857 outlines the following:
II. The term 'Indian" in the following enactments shall mean any
person to whom under the foregoing provisions, the third section of
the Act therein cited shall continue to apply; and the term "enfranchised
Indian" shall mean any person to whom the said section would have
been applicable, but for the operation of the provisions hereinafter made
in that behalf: and the term "Tribe" shall include any Band or other
recognized community of Indians.26
While this Act does not provide detailed criteria for the term "Indian," as the
1850 Act did, it does raise another interesting issue: the idea of community.
The second, third and fourth sections of the 1850 Act mentioned residency.
The 1875 Act uses the term a "recognized community of Indians." This
recognition was undoubtedly left to the "Visiting Superintendent of each
Tribe of Indians" as this would have corresponded with the Superintendent's
identified duties and responsibilities.27 Again, the colonizer does not see
Aboriginal people as responsible for crafting their own identity.
Similarly, the 1859 Act entitled An Act respecting the Civilizationand
Enfranchisement of certain Indians 8 does not alleviate any confusion or

25.

S. Prov. C. 1857 (20 Vict.), c. 26 [GradualCivilization].

26.

Ibid., s. II [emphasis added].

27. Ibid., s. III where it reads: "The Visiting Superintendent of each Tribe of Indians, for the time
being, the Missionary to such Tribe for the time being, and such other person as the Governor shall
appoint from time to time for that purpose, shall be Commissioners of examining Indians, being
members of such Tribe, who may desire to avail themselves of this Act."
28.

C.S.C. 1859 (22 Vict.), c.9.
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inconsistency found in pre-Confederation legislation. 29 In this Act, the
term "Indian blood" seems to have taken into account people of mixed
ancestry. However, there exists a limitation upon all these understandings
of Indian that the person must be "acknowledged as members of Indian
Tribes or Bands. residing upon lands which have never been surrendered
to the Crown." The residence or community requirement does remain
consistent but also remains undefined. Both of these factors would later
be seen in section 91(24) of the British North America Act, 186730 which
takes into account "Indians" and "Lands reserved for the Indians," and
shows the consistent intention of the colonizer to exert vast control over
Aboriginal people.
Finally, a piece of 1861 legislation entitled An Act respectingIndians
and Indian Lands3 offers a definition of Indian that is similar to, but
modified from, the definition used in 1850 and discussed earlier. It
provides:
11. For the purpose of determining what persons are entitled to hold,
use or enjoy the lands and other immoveable property belonging to
or appropriated to the use of the various tribes or bodies of Indians in
Lower Canada, the following persons and classes of persons, and none
other, shall be considered as Indians belonging to the tribe or body of
Indians interested in any such lands or immoveable property:
Firstly. All persons of Indian blood, reputed to belong to the particular
tribe or body of Indians interested in such lands or immoveable property,
and their descendants;
Secondly. All persons residing among such Indians, whose parents were
or are, or either of them was or is, descended on either side from Indians,
or an Indian reputed to belong to the particular tribe or body of Indians
interested in such lands or immoveable property, and the descendants of
all such persons; And
Thirdly. All women lawfully married to any of the persons included in
the several classes hereinbefore designated; the children issue of such
marriages, and their descendants.32
29.

Ibid. s. I, which reads, in part, as follows:
In the following enactments, the term "Indian" means only Indians or persons of Indian
blood or intermarried with Indians, acknowledged as members of Indian Tribes or Bands
residing upon lands which have never been surrendered to the Crown (or which having
been so surrendered have been set apart or are then reserved for the use of any Tribe or
Band of Indians in .common), and who themselves reside upon such lands, and have not
been exempted from the operation of the next section under the other provisions of this
Act.
30. ConstitutionAct, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 91, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985,App. 1,No. 5
[B.N.A. Act].
31. C.S.L.C. 1861 (23 Vict.), c.14.
32. Ibid., s. XI.
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All aspects of this definition appear quite broad. This is especially true

in regard to the second category outlined. The descendants of those
descended from Indians are explicitly accounted for in this section, bringing

individuals of mixed ancestry into the Act if they resided on unsurrendered
lands or lived among Indians. Again, this Act also imposes a residency
requirement on the definition of "Indian." Overall, the pre-Confederation
legislation shows inconsistency but establishes that the colonizer intended
to exert control over both Indians and Indian lands. While the definition of
"Indian" was imprecise, it is clear that being "Indian" involved embodying
particular cultural attributes. A failure to keep these attributes could bring
about enfranchisement.
Civilizationand assimilation
Legislation is enacted for the purpose of defining responsibilities,
jurisdiction or control. The Act of 1857 was enacted not just to control
Indians but to define Indians on an individual basis. Section III of this
Act grants the Visiting Superintendent the power to enfranchise Indians
and examine Indians for such purposes. Enfranchisement would prevent
Indian people from falling under the provisions of the Act. Indeed, they
would cease, for legal purposes, to be Indian. Once an Indian is declared
enfranchised "the legal rights and habilities of Indians... shall cease to
apply to any Indian so declared to be enfranchised, who .shallno longer
be deemed an Indian.' 3 3 If an Indian examined was male, over twentyone years of age, able to read, write, and speak English or French, have
sufficient elementary education, possess "good moral character," and carry
no debt, then that person held all the qualities to no longer be considered
Indian.34 It is strange to think that an Aboriginal person could cease to
exist as Aboriginal if they embodied enough superficial characteristics of
non-Aboriginal people.
The preamble of this Act helps to capture the full arrogance it
embodies:
WHEREAS it is desireable to encourage the progress of Civilization
among the Indian Tribes in this Province, and the gradual removal of
all legal distinctions between them and Her Majesty's other Canadian
Subjects, and to facilitate the acquisition of property and of the rights
accompanying it, by such Individual Members of the said Tribes as shall
be found to desire such encouragement and to have deserved it.3"

33. GradualCivilization, supranote 25, s. III [emphasis added].
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., Preamble.
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Since the aim of the Act was civilization of the Indians, it was directed at
eliminating Aboriginal people as a race, culture and distinct community.
In this sense it also embodied the idea that being Indian was about political
association. This is confirmed by provisions in the Act declaring that an
enfranchised Indian will "cease to have a voice in the proceedings fof his
community]." 3 6 Fortunately, the enfranchisement policies in this Act were
voluntary; however, where Indian men had a choice to enfranchise, their
spouse and children were forced to accept the decision of the husband and
father. This Act proved to be a huge failure, since only one Indian accepted
enfranchisement.3 7 As we will see below, similar criteria as those used
for enfranchisement were later used by the courts to determine Aboriginal
identity.
Overall, the legislative definitions covered above pose a couple of
problems. First, they are incorrectly based on a notion of race, rather
than political autonomy. The political affiliation of the 1857 Act is the
exception to this trend. This is, perhaps, a side effect of the popularization
of the word "Indian."38 The easiest way to refer universally to Aboriginal
people would be through race. Indeed, if "Indian" was to be defined
on a community by community basis, it would no longer function as a
universal term. The legislation above fails to differentiate among not only
Aboriginal peoples' "linguistic, ethnic and cultural differences" but also
among their histories and relations with the Crown.

36. Ibid., s. VII.
37. Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on AboriginalPeoples: Looking Forward,Looking
Back, vol. I(Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1996) at c. 9, online: <http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/
ch/rcap/sg/sg23_e.html#76> [RCAP], where it is written:
The voluntary enfranchisement policy was a failure. Only one Indian, Elias Hill, was
enfranchised between 1857 and the passage of the Indian Act in 1876. His story was told in
Chapter 6. Indians protested the provisions of the Gradual Civilization Act and petitioned
for its repeal. In addition, Indian bands individually refused to fund schools whose goals
were assimilative, refused to participate in the annual band census conducted by colonial
officials, and even refused to permit their reserves to be surveyed for purposes of the 50acre allotment that was to be the incentive for enfranchisement.
38. There were several pieces of legislation that run contrary to the application of a general identifier
like "Indian." This legislation is directed at specific nations. See, e.g., An Act to prevent the sale
of spirituous liquors and strong waters in the tract occupied by the Moravian Indians on the river
Thames S.Prov. C. 1801 (41 Geo. III), c. 8; An Act the better to protect the Mississaugatribes living
on the Indian reserve of the river Credit, S.Prov. C.. 1829 (10 Geo. IV), c. 3; and An Act to enable the
Huron Indians of La Jeune Lorette to regulate the cutting of wood in their Reserve, "S.Prov.C.. 1864
(27 & 28 Vict.), c. 69. For a summary of early statutes from colonial America see Mark D. Waiters,
"Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut (1705-1773) and the Legal Status of Aboriginal Customary Laws
and.Government in British North America" (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall L.J. 785.
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None of the examples of pre-Confederation legislation allows any
role for Aboriginal nations to determine their own membership.39 This
is not surprising since, as stated earlier, the universal notion of Indian
removes the debate from Aboriginal nations. This debate is a debate about
words, rather than a debate about needs, desires and intents of Aboriginal
peoples. The legislated debate removes Aboriginal peoples' rights and
responsibilities as the first inhabitants of this land and from a nation-tonation relationship to an imposed discussion of the definition of words.
These words are taken from the language of the colonizer and defined
according to colonial norms. For example, in the case of the Mtis, instead
of talking about their rights and responsibilities vis-a-vis the Crown, they
have to first talk about the definition of "Indian." If Mtis are "Indian"
then they fall under section 91(24) and thus under federal jurisdiction. If
they are not Indian then they must negotiate with the provinces. Instead
of discussing rights and responsibilities outright, the debate once again
becomes preoccupied with definitions. Such legislative definitions are
given content through legal decisions. These early pieces of legislation
were precursors to the Indian Act. The first Indian Act appeared in 1876
and it embodied many of the provisions from earlier legislation. But it
also incorporated criminal offences which required courts to identify and
define those who appeared in such criminal proceedings. So, from here
we change venues and follow colonial definitions into the courts.
IV. Guilty as charged:He ' an "Indian"

Several IndianAct provisions have included offences in which one of the
elements rests upon an individual being an Indian. In most of the cases
below, the IndianAct made it illegal for Indians to purchase, make, possess,
or consume intoxicants. The Indian Act is a perverse piece of colonial
40
legislation that has governed most aspects of First Nations people's lives.
For the most part, I have chosen the cases below because one of the
requisite elements of the offence was that the person in question was, in
fact, an Indian. Here again we can draw upon two themes. The first theme
involves the power to speak and be heard. The colonizer values colonial
authority over Aboriginal expression. The second theme involves colonial
expectations concerning appearance and cultural identifiers. The same style
39. It is worth noting that in 1985 amendments to the Indian Act made it possible for Bands to
develop their own citizenship codes. Such membership does not confer Indian status. For a review
of these citizenship powers see Shin Imai, AboriginalLaw Handbook,2d ed. (Scarborough: Carswell,
1999) at 155-63.
40. For an account of the divisive consequences of definitions, including Indian Act definitions, see
Harold Cardinal, The Unjust Society: The Tragedy of CanadasIndians (Edmonton: M.G. Hurtig Ltd.,
1969) at 18-26.
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of superficial criteria which were used to invoke enfranchisement policy
are used in the reasoning of the courts in order to identify "Indians."
Voice and colonialauthority
A good example of Indian identity being incorporated into the offence is
found in R. v. Modeste.41 Modeste was charged for contravening section
94(b) of the IndianAct which stated:
94. An Indian who
(a) has intoxicants in his possession,
(b) is intoxicated, or
(c) makes or manufactures intoxicants
off a reserve, is guilty of an offence and is liable on summary conviction
to a fine of not less than ten dollars and not more than fifty dollars or to
imprisonment 4for
a term not exceeding three months or to both fine and
2
imprisonment.
The Court went on to state the elements of the offence: "(1) That the
accused is an Indian; (2) That he was intoxicated; and (3) That he was
intoxicated off a reserve, and each of these must be established beyond a
reasonable doubt." 43 It is the first element that I am concerned with here.
In Modeste the father and mother of the accused were both called
to testify. They indicated that the accused was a Loucheux Indian, as
they were. However, they stated that their son was trying "to get out of
Treaty." 44 Counsel for the accused was willing to admit that his client was
an Indian. However, the Court disallowed the admission citing a common
law rule which prevents an accused from admitting to the court elements
of a crime. 45 Granted, such an admission would have been to Modeste's
detriment, but this was his opportunity to say "this is who I am" and it
was denied. While this might seem like a minor problem in the context
of one criminal trial, it is really a much broader issue because it reveals
the dizzying levels of the colonial imposition. Although Modeste had
accepted the term "Indian," and was facing the imposed oppression of
the Indian Act and the authority assumed under the B.N.A. Act, he was
denied the ability to declare "I am an Indian." Instead, another layer of
41. R. v. Modeste (aliasSimon) (1959), 127 C.C.C. 197,31 W.W.R. 84 [Modeste].
42. Ibid. at 198.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid. "Taking Treaty" means accepting the benefits of a treaty and acquiring status of
band members. Getting "out of treaty" would involve a relinquishing of such benefits through
enfranchisement.
45. Ibid. On this point Sissons J. stated: "Counsel for the accused stated that.he was prepared to
admit that his client was an Indian within the meaning of the Act. Counsel could not make such an
admission in these proceedings. At common law nothing could be taken as admitted on a criminal
trial."
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colonialism was placed in his path where the common law was used to
deny his expression of identity.
In response to the above, one could argue that legal rules exist within a
specific legal context and should not be given effect outside the courtroom.
I agree, but this doesn't change the relationship within law and society.
This goes back to the earlier point about words. The law, being largely
about the definition of words, can have the effect of placing those who
study and work with it in a state of tunnel vision. Specifically, it is very
easy to get so caught up in definitions and legal rules that the context is
entirely discarded. A huge part of the context in regards to Aboriginal
people is a constant and it should be a necessary part of any legal analysis
on Aboriginal issues. That context is one of colonialism and oppression
and, as Monture-Angus recognizes, "[o]nly by understanding the history
of the Canadian legal system can we then understand why the result of this
system is not justice but exclusion and force."46 That is why parts of this
paper are devoted to that history. One doesn't have to step too far back
from the nuts and bolts of the case to realize that the core of the offence in
the cases I am discussing is being an Indian. If the colonizer is attempting
to control the behaviour of the colonized it will be a responsibility of the
colonial courts to identify the colonized people. To this end, judges may
rely on what they have learned "Indians" are in popular opinion or they
may search for a definition in legislation. But the court's responsibility in
identifying Aboriginal people is helped a great deal if colonial authority,
such as an Indian agent, has an opinion on the matter. In R. v. Pickard7 the
court relied upon both the outward appearance of the "Indians," and the
word of the Indian agent: "Mr. Blach, the Indian agent, and Mr. Foley, the
Indian interpreter, both stated that both Ward and Bonenose were Indian,
'took treaty,' belonged to Enoch's band, and lived in the Indian reserve at
Stony Plain."48 Part of the blind adherence to colonial authority obviously
stems from the rule of law. This principle values the colonial party over
those who are to be colonized because it is the colonizer who makes the
law.
Another way in which colonial authority goes unquestioned is the lack
of recognition that is given to Aboriginal voice. Without such recognition it
is difficult to imagine a court questioning its position and its functioning as
an agent of colonialism. In R. v. Tronson,49 George Tronson was convicted

46. Monture-Angus, Thunder, supranote I at 35.
47. Rv. Pickard(1908), 14 C.C.C. 33,7 W.L.R. 797 [Pickard].
48. Ibid. at 34.
49. (1931), 57 C.C.C. 383, (1932), 1 W.W.R. 537 [Tronson].
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for unlawfully residing on Okanagan Indian Reserve No. 1. Tronson was
an unlawful resident because he did not belong to the particular band and
he was not a child of a band member. It is important to note that Tronson
was asked by the Indian agent 0 to remove himself from the reserve, but
there is no mention in the case of the reserve community asking Tronson to
remove himself. Despite not being a band member, Tronson still claimed
to be Indian. In refutation of Tronson's claim, the Crown produced an
application that Tronson had made for a land grant under the Land Act,
1924. 11 Under that Act, no Indian was permitted, except with special
permission, which Tronson did not receive, to obtain a grant. On this
point, the Court stated the following:
Tronson cannot now blow hot and blow cold. He cannot in one breath
say in effect that he is a white man, and in the next say that he is an
Indian. Similarly, Mr. McGusty produced the original application of the
appellant to be registered as a provincial voter for N. Okanagan Electoral
District. No Indian is permitted to so apply. Tronson had his name
placed on the voters' list.. .This is absolutely fatal to the position Tronson
now takes before this Court, that he is entitled to the rights and privileges
of an Indian under the Indian Act. 2
The Court assumes that Tronson was, through applying for land and the
ability to vote, asserting that he was white. Why can an Indian not do
these things? Because, as the Court would say, the legislation forbade
it. Even if a mistake was made in letting an Indian get on the voters
list, it appears that the mere fact that Tronson applied was detrimental
to his case. The Court saw Tronson's application as a declaration of his
whiteness, effectively incorporating an enfranchisement provision, into the
LandAct. Tronson's defence produced two witnesses who had knowledge
of Tronson's Indian ancestry. However, with Tronson "blowing both hot
and cold" such information was not overly compelling. 3

50. The Indian agent had earlier granted permission for Tronson's wife to come on the reserve to
take care of her dying mother. After the mother passed away, the permission to reside on the reserve
expired. As a child of a band member, Tronson's wife would have been entitled to reside on the
reserve. However, at that time Indian status passed through males and therefore, Tronson's status,
or lack of it, overrode his wife's. The Indian agent was empowered to carry out various duties as
provided in the IndianAct. The position no longer exists. A review of the responsibilities of the Indian
agent can be found in RCAP, supra note 37.
51. Tronson, supra note 49 at 390.
52. Ibid. at 390-91.
53. Even if the Court decided that Tronson was "Indian" there remained little doubt that Tronson was
not "an Indian of the band in question." Ibid. at 391.
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Appearance and cultural markers
Appearance has played a large factor in determining Indian identity. In R.
v. Martin 4 Appellate Court judge Meredith recounted one of the findings
of the trier of fact: "I gather, from the report of the proceedings before him,
that he was satisfied from the man's appearance that he was an Indian, and
that he asked the question, 'Are you an Indian?' only to have that which
was apparent confirmed by the man's oath."' 5 This case, in contrast to
Modeste, saw the Court give some weight to the oath of the Aboriginal'
accused. Nonetheless, this oath was only used to confirm that which was
obvious from observing the appearance of the accused. Aboriginal people
did not have to be in the position of the accused to have their identity
challenged.
Even when an Indian is not the one charged with the crime, the
judgment of the court can appear as if the Aboriginal person's identity
is exactly what is on trial. In dealing with the illegal sale of liquor to an
Indian, the courts often found it necessary to put the alleged Indian on trial,
in the sense that their status as an Indian needed to be confirmed. Indeed,
the presence of an Indian buying liquor was absolutely necessary to the
commission of the crime. So, some of these decisions look as if it is the
alleged Indian that is being tried and not the person who sold the liquor.
For example, in R. v. Mellon56 Charles Pepin, a 'half-breed,' purchased
liquor from Mellon. It is interesting to note that the name of the accused
never appears in full in the body of the decision, although the name of the
"Indian" appears several times. Such detail helps emphasize that this trial
was really about the Indian attributes of the "half-breed," rather than the
actions of the accused. In determining Pepin's Indian identity the court
wrote:
Charles Pepin himself was examined before me, and he swore that he
never dressed like an Indian; that he had worked for one Donald McLeod
freighting between Calgary and Edmonton for two summers; that he never
wore moccasins; that he was driving a pair of horses and selling posts the
day he got the liquor. In fact, Pepin speaks English fluently and dresses
better than many ordinary white men; there is no indication whatsoever
in his appearance, in his language or in his general demeanour, that he
does not belong to the better class of half-breeds. It is a fact, though,
that he 'took treaty' about fifteen years ago, and according to Regina
v. Howson ... a half-breed having taken treaty is an Indian within the
meaning of the Indian Act."
54. (1917), 29 C.C.C. 189, 39 D.L.R. 635 [Martin].
55. Ibid at 190.
56. (1900), 5 Terr. L.R. 301, 7 C.C.C. 179 [Mellon]. For a similar case see: R. v. Verdi (1914), 23
C.C.C. 47.
57. Ibid. at 301-02.
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And so, the court made Pepin an Indian despite the fact that he "never wore
moccasins," had a job, spoke English, and wore nice clothes. All of these
identifiers were used to establish that Pepin belonged to the "better class of
half-breeds." However, even though he had taken treaty, Pepin did not look
enough like an Indian to be considered an Indian for the purposes of the
offence. And once again I must stress that this is not merely a turn of legal
reasoning.. Specifically, it was not just the Indian Act legislation which set
out that Pepin should be considered an Indian. Instead, he was found to be
an Indian because the colonial power has confiscated the human right58 of
Aboriginal people to define, for themselves, who they are. That, as much
as anything else, is what these cases represent.
This case also illustrates the courts' reliance on similar cultural markers
which were used in the enfranchisement provisions of pre-Confederation
legislation. Indian regalia serves as an interesting identifier, the assumption
being that if you remove your regalia then you must not be Indian. In
Pickard, Ward and Bonenose, two Indians, purchased intoxicant and
business calendars from Pickard. In establishing that Ward and Bonenose
were Indians the court stated:
Each knew only a few words of English. Pickard asked them no questions
whatever. They got the calendars by pointing to them and asking for
them in Cree. They wore moccasins. Both belonged to Enoch's band
and lived in an Indian reserve, and both took treaty.59

After reviewing Mellon Taylor J., stated:
Compare this with the present case. Ward was fairly dark, wore
moccasins, could speak little or no English, and looks a good deal like
an Indian. Bonenose, who accompanied Ward, was rather darker than
Ward, wore moccasins, could speak no English, excepting a few words,
and is, so far as I can tell, very much like an Indian, in appearance, even
58. This right was recognized in the 1994 United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples; Part I, art. 3 states: "Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination. By
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development"; Part II, art. 8 states: "Indigenous peoples have the collective and individual
right to maintain and develop their distinct identities and characteristics, including the right to identify
themselves as indigenous and to be recognized as such"; and Part VII, art. 32 states: "Indigenous
peoples have the collective right to determine their own citizenship in accordance with their customs
and traditions. Indigenous citizenship does not impair the right of indigenous individuals to obtain
citizenship of the States in which they live." Online: United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights<http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/%28Symbol%29/E.CN.4.SUB.2.RES. 1994.45.
En?Open Document>. No longer a draft declaration, the United Nations adopted the Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples with 144 votes in favour, eleven abstentions and four votes against.
Canada, United States, Australia, and New Zealand all voted against. The declaration can be found
online at: <htip://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/indigenous/declaration.htm>.
59. Pickard,supranote 47 at 34.
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more so than Ward.'
Rather than just trying to establish whether Bonenose and Ward were
Indians, the court found that Bonenose appeared to be an Indian "even more
so" than Ward. Was it just his appearance? If it was just his appearance,
then was it his hair? Darker? Longer? Braided? Did he wear regalia? A
feather? Moccasins? Beaded animal skins? The problem of regalia is not
limited to the expectations the colonizers hold of Aboriginal people. At
times, Aboriginal articles of clothing and regalia have become relics for
Aboriginal people too because wearing them risks affirming their identity
to the colonizer. Harold Cardinal explains:
When I attended a white school, there were a very few Indians there.
None ever wore articles of Indian apparel. When winter came, I put
on my mukluks. Some of the other Indian students came to me and
suggested I shouldn't wear them. My mukluks called attention to the
fact that I was an Indian. But I continued to wear them, not as any sort of
hollow protest and not feeling particularly self-righteous -just warm.6
Why not wear a pair of "modem" winter boots to stay warm? The problem
with this question is that it assumes that the products of the colonizer are
intrinsically superior to Aboriginal wares. The suggestion by other Indian
students that mukluks shouldn't be wom to school is a result of their
learned inferiority:
the Canadian non-Indian society puts its own peer group at the centre
of all things desirable and rates all other cultures accordingly. It is an
assumption, quite often becoming a conviction, that the values, the ways
of life, the whole culture of one's own group must be superior to those
of others. Tell a person long enough and often enough that he is inferior,
and likely he will eventually accept the false image you thrust upon
62

him.

Aboriginal people have been taught that they are both incapable and
worthless. This can be accomplished very simply by making certain
people feel like they don't belong. In such an environment why would
you want your Aboriginal identity to show?
Let us consider that regalia when not used becomes a relic. Harold
Cardinal was wearing his mukluks. Similarly, I use my sash. Regalia, in
everyday life as in the courtroom, become symbols of resistance if only
because they don't look like the types of regalia that the majority wears.
60. Ibid.
61. Cardinal, supra note 40 at 22.
62. Ibid. at 4-5.
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Most of the time I wear my sash on those days when, for one reason or
another, I feel vulnerable because it gives me strength through the pride
that I feel towards my people and our history. My sash also makes a
comfortable belt and a warm winter scarf. Does the fact that I use my sash
make me more Mrtis in the eyes of the law? Do I have to wear it everyday
to be considered Mrtis?
Beyond the continuing offensive nature of deliberating over one's
identity (is there a non-offensive way to do this?) the court clearly
establishes itself as a colonial participant. This is done by reference to
stereotypes about "Indianness" and also by accepting the evidence of nonIndian colonial agents about Ward and Bonenose's identity. Both of these
methods involve prescribing attributes to Aboriginal people.
There are several things to keep in mind about the cases above.. One
should note the superficial way that Aboriginal people were defined by
the courts.6 3 What I find most disturbing about these cases is that at no
point is an Aboriginal person or community empowered to freely decide
such important issues. At the first instance, membership in the band is
not controlled by Aboriginal people, the right to reside on the reserve is
not controlled by Aboriginal people, and certainly neither is the .ability to
define your community. Further on, we see that the decision and ability
to remove people from the Reserve rests in the hands of non-Aboriginal
people, as does the power to press charges. Finally, in the decision of the
court we see that the ability to define oneself as Indian, however faulty
that term is, does not reside with Aboriginal people. It is the court and
colonial officials that assume that responsibility. And, in Tronson's case,
the colonial court was arrogant enough to proceed on the assumption that
if Tronson was acting in contradictory ways by blowing both hot and cold,
it is the non-Aboriginal acts that override the Indian. 64

63. See Constance Backhouse, "'Race' definition run amuck: 'slaying the dragon of Eskimo status'
before the Supreme Court of Canada, 1939" in Dianne Kirkby & Catharine Coleborne, eds., Law
History, Colonialism: The Reach of Empire (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001) 65 at
71.
64. Although being made for a different purpose, a modem manifestation of these criteria of identity
can be found in Binnie J.'s decision in Mitchell v. Canada (Ministerof NationalRevenue - MN.R.),
[2001] 1 S.C.R. 911 [Mitchell] at para. 131 where Binnie writes:
[Grand Chief Mitchell] lives with a foot simultaneously in two cultural communities, each
with its own framework of legal rights and responsibilities. As Kanentakeron he describes
learning from his grandfather the spiritual practices of the People of the Longhouse, whose
roots in North America go back perhaps 10,000 years. Yet the name Michael Mitchell
announces that he is also part of modern Canada who watches television from time to time
and went to high school in Cornwall. As much as anyone else in this country, he is a part
of our collective sovereignty.
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It is not just that Aboriginal people "lose" cases like this which makes
them offensive. Mary Ellen Turpel explains that it is the imposition of the
colonial state which is problematic for Aboriginal interests:
Whether aboriginal peoples win or lose their particular cases in Canadian
courts, or whether the law seems appropriately situated as a guardian of
aboriginal interests, there is certainly much to lose by using colonial legal
structures. To win may simply mean to more fully situate yourselves as
a subordinate to a paternal guardian state... [I]t is others (the Canadian
colonial legal regime) who officially have the power to define aboriginal
existence, experience and even aboriginal struggles against it when legal
doctrine is utilized.6
Placing Aboriginal people in a subordinate position in relation to the law
necessarily dehumanizes them. It assumes that their definitions of the
world are inadequate, unofficial, or otherwise untenable. It makes colonial
law the official voice and Aboriginal people just another litigant.
R. v. Drybones66 illustrates how Aboriginal people become irrelevant
in the shuffle of colonial law. Drybones was another case dealing with
the intoxicant and intoxication provisions of the Indian Act. Drybones
challenged these provisions based on guarantees in the CanadianBill of
Rights, which reads in part:
1. It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have
existed and shall continue to exist without discrimination by reason of
race, national origin, colour, religion or sex, the following human rights
and fundamental freedoms, namely,

(b) the right of the individual
to equality before the law and the
67
protection of the law;
The Supreme Court found section 94(b) of the IndianAct was inoperative
because it denied Drybones equality before the law. Ritchie J., for the
majority, explained:
I think that the word "law" as used in s. 1(b) of the Bill of Rights is to
be construed as meaning "the law of Canada" as defined in s. 5(2) (i.e.,
Acts of the Parliament of Canada and any orders, rules or regulations
thereunder) and without attempting any exhaustive definition of"equality
before the law" I think that s. 1(b) means at least that no individual or
group of individuals is to be treated more harshly than another under that

65.
66.
67.

Mary Ellen Turpel, "Home/Land" (1991) 10 Can. J. Fam. L. 17 at 19-20.
R.v. Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282 [Drybones].
CanadianBill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44 as cited in ibid.
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law, and I am therefore of opinion that an individual is denied equality
before the law if it is made an offence punishable at law, on account of
his race, for him to do something which his fellow Canadians are free to
do without having
committed any offence or having been made subject
68
to any penalty.
It is evident from this reasoning that the decisions of colonial courts
remain problematic even when Aboriginals "win." Here we see "the law
of Canada" doing as it pleases with Aboriginal people. At the whim of
the colonizer, Aboriginal people were given a reprieve from one tentacle
of colonialism. However, it is readily apparent that Aboriginal agency is
wholly disregarded in such matters. Drybones was not given an acquittal
because the laws of Canada did not apply or because Aboriginal jurisdiction
prevailed over Aboriginal people or even because of some overriding
principles ofjustice. Instead, Drybones was acquitted because one "Act of
the Parliament of Canada and any orders, rules or regulations thereunder"
was in contravention of another "Act of the Parliament of Canada and
any orders, rules or regulations thereunder." Colonial authority remained
intact and was wholly relied upon in formulating the outcome. 69 In this
way, the broader picture of Aboriginal people's relations with the courts is
mirrored in how Aboriginal identity is determined within the courts. And
this process has continued under constitutional, rather than legislative,
authority.
V. The Constitution andthe Supreme Court
Colonialism has deep roots. These roots give life to both the case law and
the constitutional tree which cast a large shadow over Aboriginal people.
I will discuss four constitutional documents which demand a definition of
Aboriginal people in one way or another. The first of these constitutional
provisions is section 91(24) of the B.N.A. Act which gives the Parliament
of Canada legislative jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the
Indians."70 Second, the NaturalResourceTransferAgreementprovides that
Indians will have the right to hunt, trap or fish for food on all unoccupied
Crown lands during all seasons of the year subject to provincial laws that
do not infringe these rights. 7 Third, the Manitoba Act, 1870 refers to

68. Drybones, ibid.
69. Also see Lavell v. Canada (Attorney General), [1974] 2 S.C.R. 1349 where colonial authority
over Indians is affirmed.
70. B.N.A Act, supranote 30.
71. Natural Resource Transfer Agreement, 1930, being Schedule I to the Constitution Act, 1930,
(U.K.) 20 & 21 Geo. V., c. 26, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II [NRTA].
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35 of the

35. (1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples
of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.
(2) In this Act, "aboriginal peoples of Canada" includes the Indian,
Inuit and Mtis peoples of Canada.73
I will introduce these constitutional provisions through the case law
that has developed around them. In this section I hope to show that the
Supreme Court of Canada has developed methods of defining Aboriginal
people which are both colonial and dehumanizing. I will show that these
methods are still being used in recent cases.
Re Eskimos and section 91(24)
Re Eskimos was the result of a controversy between the federal government
and the province of Quebec. The issue was one of financial responsibility
for the "Eskimo" inhabitants in the province of Quebec. The federal
government was denying responsibility on the grounds that section 91(24)
did not contemplate the inclusion of the "Eskimo" under that section.
However, the province of Quebec put forth a broader understanding of
that section and argued that the federal government had to foot the bill
since the "Eskimo" were "Indians" under section 91(24). The issue was,
therefore, brought to the Supreme Court of Canada as a reference case.
The justices of the Court released three judgments, all of them concurring
in the result that the "Eskimo" were "Indian" under section 91(24).
The majority decision, written by Chief Justice Duff, set out the problem
as a standard question of statutory interpretation.7 4 The resolution of this

72.

Manitoba Act, 1870, S.C. 1870,.c. 3, s. 31 reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 8 [Manitoba

Act].
73. ConstitutionAct, 1982, s. 35, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. Also
see s. 25 of the Charterof Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule
B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
74. Reference As to Whether the term "Indians" inS. 91(24) of the British North America Act, 1867,
Includes Eskimo Inhabitantsof the Prvinceof Quebec, [1939] S.C.R. 104 at 105 [Re Eskimos] where
the Court writes:
The reference with which we are concerned arises out of a controversy between the Dominion
and the province of Quebec touching the question whether the Eskimo inhabitants of that
province are 'Indians' within the contemplation of head no. 24 of section 91 of the British
North America Act which is in these words, 'Indians and Lands Reserved for Indians'; and
under the reference we are to pronounce upon that question.
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question turns on defining the word "Indian."" Of foremost consideration
by the Court was census data collected by the Hudson's Bay Company
which lumped the "Esquimaux" in with the other "Indian Races."76 Other
77
historical documents referenced the "Eskimo" as "Esquimaux Indians"
and "Esquimaux savages. '78 The Court also referred back to a report of
1798 where a reference is again made to "Esquimaux Indians."' 79 Basing his
decision on the balance of the historical evidence before him Chief Justice
Duff concluded that section 91(24) did indeed include the "Eskimo."
Similarly, Justice Kerwin's judgment engaged a select list of dictionaries
to establish a link that the "Eskimo" were considered "as one of the Indian
tribes."80 Both decisions illustrate how legal decisions are often about no
more than the turn of words.
The most interesting of the three judgments was delivered by Justice
Cannon. In his reasons, Justice Cannon compared the English and French
texts of section 91(24) and concluded that "the English word 'Indians'
was equivalent to or equated the French word 'Sauvages' and included
all the present and future aborigines native subjects of the proposed
Confederation of British North America."'" I say that this judgment is the
most interesting because it engaged two languages and histories into the
analysis, thus broadening the debate. However, all the judgments issued
by the Court were lacking in general guidance:
The court made no attempt to sort through the profuse, rambling list
of factors, nor to offer guidance on matters of racial designation for
the future. It simply declared as a matter of Canadian law, because the
framers of the British North America Act had done so, that Inuit would
be equated part of the 'Indian race' forever.8
Being a possession automatically implies that, on some level, even the
most progressive looking law is going to treat one as an object. In the case
of section 91(24), "[a]s long as [it] remains a part of Canada's constitution,

75. Ibid at 106 where Duff, CJ. writes: "in determining the meaning of the words 'Indians' in the
statute, we have to consider the meaning of that term as applied to the inhabitants of British North
America .... It is, therefore, important to consult the reliable sources of information as to the use of the
term 'Indian' in relation to the Eskimo in those territories. Fortunately, there is evidence of the most
authoritative character furnished by the Hudson's Bay Company itself."
76. Ibid at 107.
77. Ibid. at 110.
78. bid. at I1!.
79. Ibid. at 112.
80. Ibid. at 119.
81. Ibid. at 118.
82. Backhouse, supranote 63 at 74.
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Indian people will never be free of our subordinated position." 3 Backhouse
sees this case as a continuation of the "conundrum" that was the definition
of "Indian. 5' 4 At the outset Aboriginal peoples were excluded from
contributing to the original definition of "Indian." This is not surprising
since it was a term created and imposed by Europeans. Then this word, and
the peoples it covers, was placed into an equally exclusive legal process.
Therefore, court decisions will undoubtedly produce a definition that has
no meaning for those being defined.
It can be argued that section 91(24) serves as a protection for
Aboriginal people. It protects them from direct attacks from unchecked
provincial powers. And, seen in its best light, section 91(24) does not
make Aboriginal people objects but, instead, imposes duties on the federal
government to defend Aboriginal people and rights. There are two
problems with this approach. First, section 91(24) has historically been
used to justify the federal legislative incursions on Aboriginal people as
seen in cases discussed previously in this paper.85 Second, as the Court in
Campbell notes, this division of powers (or responsibilities) is an internal
division to the Crown. This means that the division of powers cannot
affect Aboriginal rights against the Crown as a whole. So, to say that
section 91(24) protects Aboriginal people from the exercise of provincial
Crown authority is a misguided view of the issue. This is especially true
considering that provincial laws of general application apply to Indians. 6
Re Eskimos involved identity, at least legal identity, in that it was not
only interpreting a particular section of the Constitution but was, in so
doing, actually defiming a people. It is clear that legal "status" such as that

83. Monture-Angus, Independence, supranote 6 at 34.
84. Backhouse, supranote 63 at 71 where she writes, "The full arrogance of government authorities
was transparently obvious in the 1876 Indian Act, which contained the rather startling statement that
the word 'person' did not include 'Indian'."
85. Perhaps the Campbell decision symbolizes a renewed emphasis on federal responsibilities in
section 91(24). Campbell v. British Columbia (Attorney General) [2000] B.C.J. No. 1524 at para.
82 [Campbell] where Williamson J. states: "Thus, in 1867 it became the Crown in right of Canada,
rather than the British Crown, which assumed responsibility for the obligations of the Crown towards
aboriginal peoples, a responsibility which amounted to a fiduciary duty." Also, see the dissenting
opinion of Gwynne J. in St. CatharinesMillingand Lumber Co. v. Ontario (Attorney General) (1887),
13 S.C.R. 577.
86. SeeR. v. Shade (1952), 102 C.C.C. 316at317wheres. 87 (nows. 88) of thelndianAct reads:
Subject to the terms of any treaty and any other Act of the Parliament of Canada, all laws
of general application from time to time in force in any province are applicable to and in
respect of Indians in the province, except to the extent that such laws are inconsistent with
this Act or any order, rule, regulation or by-law made thereunder, and except to the extent
that such laws make provision for anymatter for which provision is made by or under this
Act.
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under the IndianAct has divisive consequences among Aboriginal people. 7
However, while Indian status provisions confer "privileges" directly upon
those who carry it, federal jurisdiction does not, on its own, guarantee any
more rights or privileges for those groups that fall under section 91 (24).88
Yet, there is a danger in writing off the process in Re Eskimos as mere legal
speak. Colonialism isn't only about confiscating lands; it is also about
controlling mind and spirit. This is accomplished by controlling the rules,
venue, issues, and decision-makers in the debates.
The impact of the law is evident in every case that brings Aboriginal
people before the courts. In each instance, the law demands thatAboriginal
people respond in the language of the law. Backhouse has noted that there
are serious consequences in applying definitions of race to people.8 9 Since
Re Eskimos decided that "Eskimo" are "Indians" under the B.N.A. Act, so
too is this true for Aboriginal people speaking the language of the law in
future cases. This process results in cultural invasion where the oppressed
are forced to fmd legitimacy in wider society by adopting the norms of the
oppressor. Freire states this in the following way:
Cultural conquest leads to the cultural inauthenticity of those who are
invaded; they begin to respond to the values, the standards, and the goals
of the invaders.. .In cultural invasion it is essential that those who are
invaded come to see their reality with the outlook of the invaders rather
than their own; for the more they mimic the invaders, the more stable the
position of the latter becomes. 9°

87. For more discussion on this divisiveness, see Cardinal, supra note 40. Also see RCAP, supra
note 37 where the impact of Bill-C3 1,which was meant to return Indian status to women who had lost
it by marrying out, produced a type of status math which would see the elimination of Indian status
altogether:
Actually the whole section in Bill C-31 on status has affected all Bands in Canada. The Bill
was written to eliminate discrimination in the Indian Act. What it has really done is found
a way to eliminate status Indians all together.
Thus, it can be predicted that in future there may be bands on reserves with no status
Indian members. They will have effectively have been assimilated for legal purposes
into provincial populations. Historical assimilation goals will have been reached, and the
federal government will have been relieved of its constitutional obligation of protection,
since there will no longer be any legal 'Indians' left to protect.
Online: <http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/sg/sg26_c.html#93>.
88. The Congress of Aboriginal Peoples believes that rights flow from the fiduciary duty that the
Crown owes to Aboriginal people. See Daniels, supranote 21.
89. Backhouse, supra note 63 at 74 where she states, "Racial categorization is not a minor matter:
despite the appalling emptiness of racial categories, and the artificiality and impermanence of such
terminology, racial concepts have had important economic, social and political consequences for those
affected by them. The legal system has played a major part in this process."
90. Freire, supranote 7 at 134.
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Along with presenting another obvious barrier to Aboriginal peoples'
self-definition, decisions such as Re Eskimos reinforce the paternalism
of section 91(24) which in turn hinders the sovereignty aspirations of
Aboriginal nations. This does not exhaust the problems that section 91(24)
created. There is a renewed scholarly focus on whether section 91(24),
in addition to including "Indians" and "Eskimo," includes the Mtis or
"Half-breeds." 9' No doubt such a debate will also ask who the Mtis are.
The colonial judiciary has already provided some statements on Mtis
identity.
92
"Indian" in the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement
The Natural Resource Transfer Agreements have enjoyed much
consideration in the courts. In R. v. Blais,93 the Supreme Court of Canada

finally addressed the definition of "Indian" in the NRTAs. The decision
of the Supreme Court of Canada in Blais was preceded by several lower
court decisions on the NRTAs. Two examples of such decisions are R. v.
Grumbo94 and R. v. Laprise.95 Both Laprise and Grumbo were charged with
unlawfully possessing wildlife in contravention of provincial legislation
and both sought protection as "Indians" under colonial legislation.
Laprise and Grumbo were both cases involving unlawful hunting.
The difference between the cases was that George Laprise was held to
be a non-treaty Indian, whereas Grumbo was Mtis. Laprise is useful in
illustrating the problem with definitions. The Court in Laprisereferred to a
constitutional document, federal legislation, and provincial legislation and
each of them led to a different interpretation of "Indian." The Court was
left in a predicament that no canvassing of dictionaries, as Justice Kerwin
had done in Re Eskimos, would solve. With the colonizer using so many
legal avenues to exert control over "Indians" it is not surprising that the
Court had trouble making sense of which definition to apply. Ultimately,
the Court erred in finding that the definition of "Indian" that was contained
in the Indian Act could be inserted into the Game Act 1967. The Game
91. For further discussion on the scope of section 91(24), see Paul L.A.H. Chartrand, ed., Who are
Canada sAboriginalPeoples?Recognition, Definition andJurisdiction(Saskatoon: Purich Publishing
Ltd., 2002). See also, Mark Stevenson, "Section 91(24) and Canada's Legislative Jurisdiction with
Respect to the Mtis" (2002) 1 Indigenous L.J. 237, and Clem Chartier, "'Indian': An Analysis of the
Term as Used in Section 91(24) of the British North America Act, 1867" (1978-79) 43 Sask. L. Rev.
37. Contra Brian Schwartz, First Principles,Second Thoughts: AboriginalPeoples, Constitutional
Reform and CanadianStatecraft (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1986).
92. Natural Resources Transfer Agreement, being Schedule I to the Constitution Act, 1930 (U.K.),
20 & 21 Geo. V, c. 26 [NRTA].
93. 2003 SCC 44, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 236.
94. [1999] 1 W.W.R. 9 [Grumbo].
95. [1977] 3 W.W.R. 379 [Laprise].
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Act was intended to implement section 12 of -the NRTA. 9 6 Rather than
deferring to the definition of "Indian" in the NRTA, the Court effectively
used the Indian Act to define "Indian" for NRTA purposes. Indeed, no
distinction was made between the legislated definition of "Indian" and
the constitutional use of the term "Indian."97 This fault in the Court's
reasoning was spotted years later in Grumbo where the Laprise decision
was then considered bad law.
John Grumbo (Mftis) was charged with unlawfully possessing wildlife
under the Saskatchewan wildlife provisions then in force. After an initial
conviction in Provincial Court, Grumbo was acquitted on an appeal to the
Court of Queen's Bench. The Crown then appealed to the Saskatchewan
Court of Appeal where Grumbo's fate rested upon the interpretation of the
word "Indian" in section 12 of the NRTA. The decision of the majority in
Grumbo, after ruling that Laprisewas bad law, found that the court below
should have ordered a new trial rather than quashing the conviction. The
reasoning for this brought the Court of Appeal back to the word play in
the law:
But a more important matter is that the court, after deciding that Laprise,
and the definition of Indian found in it, upon which the Crown based its
entire case, should not be followed, then decided the case without defining
the word Indian, as used in the NaturalResources TransferAgreement,
or at least deciding whether it included a Metis such as Mr. Grumbo.
This left the Crown in the position of having the conviction quashed on
the basis that the authority upon which it relied, Laprise, was no longer
good law, and on its consequent failure to prove that Grumbo was not an
Indian without the court having defined what or who an Indian was for
the purposes of The Natural Resources TransferAgreement or, at least,
whether the word Indian included a Metis such as Mr. Grumbo. In these
circumstances, the judge Was obliged to either decide the question of
whether the word Indian in The Natural Resources Transfer Agreement
included a Metis such as Mr. Grumbo or to order a new trial to determine
the question if the evidence before the court did not provide an adequate
factual basis for a decision. He failed to do either.98

96. Section 12 of the Saskatchewan NRTA, as reproduced in Grumbo, supranote 94 at 14, reads as
follows:
In order to secure to the Indians of the Province the continuance of the supply of game and
fish for their support and subsistence, Canada agrees that the laws respecting game in force
in the Province from time to time shall apply to the Indians within the boundaries thereof,
provided, however, that the said Indians shall have the right, which the Province hereby
assures to them, of hunting, trapping and fishing game and fish for food at all seasons of
the year on all unoccupied Crown lands and on any other lands to which the said Indians
may have a right of access.
97. Laprise,supra note 95 at 382.
98. Grumbo, supra note 94 at 20-2 1.
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Here the Court of Appeal is explaining the rules of the legal game to the
Court of Queen's Bench. It is absolutely absurd to think that issues such
as the right to hunt for food can come down to the turn of a definition of
a single word, because the Court is defining a people who continue to be
almost completely excluded from this game." Perhaps this speaks more
to the inappropriateness of having Aboriginal/Crown disputes decided
in the courts, rather than to the methods that the courts use in deciding
disputes. The Supreme Court dealt with the scope of the word "Indian" in
the NRTAs in the Blais decision. However, as discussed below, the Court
went beyond the NRTA and defined the "half-breeds" in the ManitobaAct
as well.
R. v. Blais and the Manitoba Act
Canada's top court ruled on M~tis rights twice in 2003. These cases saw
the Court define the Mrtis for the purposes of three different constitutional
° dealt with section 35(2), and the Blais decision
provisions. R. v. Powley""
sought to determine if the Mrtis were "Indians" for the purposes of the
NRTA. Despite both parties agreeing that Mr. Blais was Mrtis, and that
the issue at hand was interpretation of the NRTA, the Supreme Court also
attempted to undermine the wording of another constitutional document.
In seeking extrinsic evidence to help determine the meaning of the
NRTA, the Supreme Court looked at the Manitoba Act, which contains
a reference to "half-breed" and squarely connects that word to "Indian
Title.""'' In analyzing the Manitoba Act, the Supreme Court of Canada
went beyond the mistakes of the court in Laprise. In Blais, instead of
placing legislation above the interpretation of the constitution, the Supreme
Court of Canada placed the statements of an opposition MP ahead of a
constitutional document. Specifically, ignoring the obvious connection
between "half-breed" and "Indian Title," the court chose to rely upon a
statement of the former Prime Minister some fifteen years after the passing
99. While this is absurd it is not unusual. See for example, Edwards v. AG Canada,[192913 W.W.R.
479, [1930] A.C. 124, also known as the "persons" case where "qualified persons" in section 24 of
the B.N.A. Act was interpreted as including women. The result was that both men and women were
eligible to become members of the Senate.
100. [2003] S.C.R. 43.
101. Section 31 of the ManitobaAct, supra note 72 reads in part as follows:
And whereas, it is expedient, towards the extinguishment of the Indian Title to lands in
the Province, to appropriate a portion of such ungranted lands, to the extent of one million
four hundred thousand acres thereof, for the benefit of the families of half-breed residents,
it is hereby enacted, that, under regulations to be from time to time made by the Governor
General in Council, the Lieutenant-Governor shall select such lots or tracts in such parts of
the Province as he may deem expedient, to the extent aforesaid, and divide the same among
the children of the half-breed heads of families residing in the Province at the time of the
said transfer to Canada.
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of the Manitoba Act. In that statement, which was given near the time of
the North-West Resistance, John. A. Macdonald, sitting as a member of
the opposition, said:
Whether they [the Mtis] had any right to those lands or not was not so
much the question as it was a question of policy to make an arrangement
with the inhabitants of the Province.... 1,400,000 acres would be quite
sufficient for the purpose of compensating these men for what was called
the extinguishments of Indian title. That phrase was an incorrect one, for
the half-breeds did not allow themselves to be Indians. 102
Instead of being suspicious of the politically loaded situation in which
this statement was made, the Supreme Court used it to effectively dismiss
any influence that the Manitoba Act would have in the interpretation of
the NRTAs. The will of Parliament which established-that, at least in
certain circumstances, the "half-breeds" were "Indians" or, at the very
least, had Indian title, was effectively overridden by the words of one MP.
The fact of the matter is that even if, generally speaking, the "half-breeds
did not allow themselves to be Indians," the Parliament of Canada, the
Mftis negotiators to the Manitoba Act, and the Provisional Government
in Manitoba sanctioned the language in the Manitoba Act. These official
acts by both Canada and the Mftis made this obvious connection, but the
Supreme Court ofCanada chose to rely on the words of one parliamentarian,
who had previously approved the language in the Act.
This reasoning was later followed by the Manitoba Court of Queen's
Bench and applied directly to the interpretation of the Manitoba Act,
1870.103 In ManitobaMetis FederationInc. v. Canada(Attorney General),
the Court asserted that when the Mftis sent delegates to Ottawa to negotiate
entrance into the Dominion of Canada, these negotiations resulted in
"neither a treaty nor an agreement. Moreover, it certainly was not a treaty
or an agreement with aboriginals. Rather, it was an Act of Parliament
recognized as a constitutional document." °4 Further, the Court points out
that the Mftis were well aware that the will of parliament would determine
the nature of any act which was to be passed:

102. House of Commons Debates,vol. 11 (6 July 1885) at 3113.
103. Manitoba Metis FederationInc. v. Canada (Attorney General) [2008] 4 W.W.R. 402 at paras.
596-97 [MMF].
104. Ibid.atpara. 464. Also, at para.467 the Court does not seethe delegates as "Mtis" representatives:
"the Provisional Government operated in a manner akin to a Legislature or Parliament and represented
all of the residents of Red River, not just the Mftis, notwithstanding that the Mftis comprised an
overwhelming majority of residents in the Settlement." Moreover, at para. 468, the Court discusses the
delegates specifically: "Ritchot and Black certainly were intelligent, educated people. Neither they nor
Scott were Mftis, nor did they represent the Mftis per se, but rather all residents of the Settlement."
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If there were any doubt about this going into the negotiations, which
there should not have been, it certainly would have become clear to
the delegates from the debates in Parliament, including the speeches of
Macdonald and Cartier, and the comments of Macdonald and Cartier to
the delegates as recorded in Ritchot's diary."0 5
With this in mind, it is startling that the Court spent a large amount of
time focused on showing that the Mtis of Red River "did not consider
themselves to be Indians. They saw themselves, and wanted to be seen,
as civilized and fully enfranchised citizens."'0 6 If, on the one hand, the
Manitoba Act is representative of the will of Parliament then why are
Mtis conceptions of identity relevant? It is odd that the ManitobaAct has
been interpreted in a manner which is inconsistent with its plain wording.
It is contrary to the principles governing a constitutional democracy
that the will of Parliament takes a back seat to the words of unelected
representatives.
Of course, such reasoning is consistent only in the sphere of the
courtroom and in the context of this paper it might seem that Iam advocating
that the Aboriginal voice be disregarded in certain circumstances. Rather,
I am asking for some consistency. The court cannot respect the rule of law
and, in the next breath, disregard the will of Parliament. To do so would
be akin to "blowing both hot and cold." It is a complexity of colonial law
that forces a complete reexamination of how such historical issues are
dealt with in contemporary colonial courts.
R. v. Powley and section 35(2)
InPowley the court once again engages in defining peoples. This time
the defimition is carried out under section 35(2). The realization that legal
decisions often revolve around definitions does not operate as ajustification
for the law's oppression ofAboriginal people. Indeed, the Mtis, as a legal
object were defined by the Court in the following way:
The term 'Mtis' in s. 35 does not encompass all individuals with mixed
Indian and European heritage- rather, it refers to distinctive peoples who,
in addition to their mixed ancestry, developed their own customs, way of
life, and recognizable group identity separate from their Indian or Inuit
and European forebears. 0 7

105. Ibid. at para. 473.
106. Ibid. at para. 600. See generally paras. 600-11.
107. Powley, supra note 100 at para. 10.
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Turning identity into legalese is problematic in itself, however, the
Court reaches further and imposes the definitions of the law upon Mtis
communities as well:
We would not purport to enumerate the various Mtis peoples that
may exist. Because the M~tis are explicitly included in s. 35, it is only
necessary for our purposes to verify that the claimants belong to an
identifiable Mrtis community with a sufficient degree of continuity and
stability to support a site-specific aboriginal right. A Mrtis community
can be defined as a group of M&is with a distinctive collective identity,
living together in the same geographic area and sharing a common way
of life."'
The rigid requirements of "continuity and stability," "distinctive collective
identity" and "sharing a common way of life" are not reactive to the historic
or contemporary reality of many Mtis people's lives. Certainly, Mrtis
history cannot in general be described as meeting the requirements of
"continuity and stability."' 0 9 The latter two requirements do not recognize
the destructive impact that colonial expansion has brought to the Mrtis.
This type of reasoning by the Court is indicative of oppressive action.
Controlling definitions, history, and culture through rights litigation
plays an important role in maintaining the oppressive reality. Freire
discusses this process in the following way:
Within an objective situation of oppression, antidialogue is necessary
to the oppressor as a means of further oppression - not only economic,
but cultural: the vanquished are dispossessed of their word, their
expressiveness, their culture. Further, once a situation of oppression has
been initiated, antidialogue becomes indispensable.to its preservation."'
By placing Aboriginal identifiers in the historical past rather than the
present or recent past, the Court denies that Aboriginal people act in the
world. They merely were rather than are. Aboriginal people are denied
the luxury of adaptation and change that the oppressor society takes for
granted. The result is that Aboriginal people today are not heard. Instead,
Aboriginal peoples and cultures of the historical past are speculated upon,
defined, and judged in contemplation of the present.

108. Ibid. at para. 12.
109. A thorough account of the Mrtis "uprisings" can be found in D.N. Sprague, Canadaand the
Mitis, 1869-1885 (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1988). Also see, George F.G. Stanley,
The Birth of Western Canada:A History of the Riel Rebellions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1961).
110. Freire, supra note 7 at 119.
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Conclusion
Canadians worry about their identity. Are they too English? Are they
too American? Are they French Canadians or some other kind of hybrid?
Indians worry about their identity, too... There are towns and cities in
Canada where simply being an Indian means getting a beating.. .In such
cases an Indian foolish enough to attempt to bring charges finds himself
charged with creating a disturbance. No citizen is likely to forget his
identity under such circumstances."1
In the context of colonial law Aboriginal people certainly aren't able to
forget their identity. Indeed, after their arrest they have to appear before
the colonizer and prove that they are an Aboriginal person. Worse, they
have to do this based on criteria laid out by the colonial courts. They
cannot forget their identity because in so many cases, and in many
different ways, it is exactly that which is being put on trial. Of course, it
is Aboriginal people who bring the defence of an Aboriginal right to the
court when they are charged. This too is a function of the law. What the
1982 conferral of constitutional status upon Aboriginal rights has brought
to Aboriginal people is the further imposition of colonial definitions.
Aboriginal livelihood can be a defence against Crown aggression as long
as it is brought to the court for a full assessment on the colonizer's terms.
I am sure that when constitutional entrenchment of Aboriginal rights was
being debated, Aboriginal people did not anticipate that their identity as
individuals and communities would continue to be placed in jeopardy
through rights discourse.
Even if you see Aboriginal rights discourse as fundamentally improving
the approach of the court in cases involving Aboriginal people, two things
are clear. One, Aboriginal rights discourse has increased the scope of the
intrusion the colonizer's courts take into the realm of Aboriginality. This
represents a shift in focus. Aboriginal people used to be brought before
the courts for violations of Indian Act provisions; now they are being
brought before the courts for living in a traditionally Aboriginal way. Two,
Aboriginal rights litigation has kept Aboriginal people in the historic past
and prevents them from fully participating in the present. This includes
their identity, which continues to be put on trial each time they attempt to
avoid being found guilty of acting Aboriginal. The colonizer appears to be
saying, "if you want to act like an Aboriginal you need to prove, to us, that
you are an Aboriginal. But 'Aboriginal' is our word and we will interpret
it as we see fit."

11i. Cardinal, supra note 40 at 18.
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The failure of courts to find a way to respect Aboriginal conceptions of
self, is a reflection of the courts' allegiance to colonial values, norms and
authority. This legal mindset continues to form a barrier to a meaningful
effort at decolonization. Canadian law remains firmly planted in the
continuing colonial project which Aboriginal people continue to resist.
The words of Linda Tuhiwai Smith capture this broader struggle:
Indigenous attempts to reclaim land, language, knowledge and
sovereignty have usually involved contested accounts of the past by
colonizers and colonized. These have occurred in the courts, before
various commissions, tribunals and official enquiries, in the media, in
Parliament, in bars and on talkback radio. In these situations contested
histories do not exist in the same cultural framework as they do when
tribal or clan histories, for example, are being debated within the
indigenous community itself. They are not simply struggles over 'facts'
and 'truth'; the rules by which these struggles take place are never clear
(other than that we as the indigenous community know they are going
to be stacked against us); and we are not the final arbiters of what really
counts as the truth." 2
This paper which was written out of my frustration with the law, legal
discourse, and legal education lacks suggestions on how to move beyond the
imposition of colonial law. This is partly a reflection of the emptiness that
I felt after finishing my law degree. It is one thing to say that negotiations
and dialogue are better than having the colonizer dictate outcomes to the
colonized. It is quite another thing to have negotiations result in something
other than another avenue of colonial imposition. After all, it is not
uncommon to see treaty disputes end up in Canadian courts. Further, the
problem isn't limited to preventing colonial courts from casting judgment
upon the very nature of who Aboriginal people are. But the extent to
which colonial imposition is accepted, adapted to, or resisted is very much
dependent upon the needs of particular communities. Resistance can be
cultivated on a broad level, but in order to move beyond resistance and
find ways to actively meet the needs of Aboriginal communities, more
locally generated strategies are necessary. In some circumstances the most
direct route to finding concrete solutions may very well be through the
colonial courts. But as we have seen above, this always comes at a cost.

112. Smith, supra note 5 at 33-34.

